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Abstract 
The current research tested if explicit anti-conspiracy arguments could be an effective 
method of addressing the potentially harmful effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories.  In 
two studies, participants were presented with anti-conspiracy arguments either before, or after 
reading arguments in favor of popular conspiracy theories concerning vaccination.  In both 
studies, anti-conspiracy arguments increased intentions to vaccinate a fictional child but only 
when presented prior to conspiracy theories.  This effect was mediated by belief in anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories and the perception that vaccines are dangerous.  These findings 
suggest that people can be inoculated against the potentially harmful effects of anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories, but that once they are established, the conspiracy theories may be 
difficult to correct. 
  
Keywords: conspiracy theories; anti-vaccination; vaccination; persuasion; intentions; 
 attitude inoculation; intervention  
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Prevention is better than cure:  Addressing anti-vaccine  
conspiracy theories  
 Despite the demonstrated importance of vaccination for population health and 
wellbeing, many people opt out of government-recommended vaccination schedules for their 
children.  In some parts of the world, vaccination rates lie below the advised 95% uptake, 
leaving people at risk of serious, but preventable diseases (e.g., MMR, Health Protection 
Service, 2014).  Whilst many factors undoubtedly influence people’s decisions regarding 
vaccination, one potential obstacle may be conspiracy theories that are propagated by an 
active and prominent anti-vaccine movement.  The present investigation examines the effects 
of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories on vaccination intentions, and attempts to introduce an 
intervention to attenuate the potential harmful effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories.   
Conspiracy theories explain the ultimate causes of significant events as the secret 
actions of malevolent groups, who cover up information to suit their own interests 
(Brotherton, 2015; Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2016; Douglas & Sutton, 
2008, 2011, 2015; Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Goertzel, 1994; 
McCauley & Jacques, 1979; Sutton & Douglas, 2014; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; 
Uscinski & Parent, 2014; Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012).  For example, popular conspiracy 
theories allege that the 9/11 attacks were set up by the U.S. government to justify the war on 
terror, and that climate change is a hoax managed by climate scientists to secure research 
funding (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & 
Gignac, 2013; Wood & Douglas, 2013, 2015).  According to the most popular conspiracy 
theories associated with the issue of vaccination, data is faked and harmful side-effects of 
vaccines are hidden from the public to ensure that pharmaceutical companies and 
governments are able to make money (Kata, 2010; Offit, 2010).  These conspiracy theories 
are popular.  For example, Oliver and Wood (2014) asked American participants whether 
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they thought that doctors and governments were in favor of vaccination despite knowledge 
that vaccines cause autism.  Twenty per cent agreed and 36% were undecided.  Further, polls 
indicate that more than 20% of respondents endorse conspiracy theories that propose a link 
between childhood vaccines and autism (Public Policy Polling, 2013).  In a similar way to 
climate change conspiracy theories (Lewandowsky et al., 2013), belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories is associated with mistrust in, and rejection of, scientific evidence. 
Recent research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories may be associated with 
negative attitudes toward vaccination (Lewandowsky, et al., 2013).  There is also evidence 
that belief in, and exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories directly predicts people’s 
intentions to vaccinate.  Specifically, Jolley and Douglas (2014a) found that belief in anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories predicted intentions to vaccinate a fictional child.  Further, 
participants who were exposed to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (vs. anti-conspiracy 
information and a control condition) were reluctant to vaccinate a fictional child.  Anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories therefore predict the extent to which people are willing, at least 
in principle, to engage with vaccination (see also Douglas & Leite, in press; Douglas, Sutton, 
Jolley, & Wood, 2015; Jolley & Douglas, 2014b for similar effects associated with politics, 
climate change, and conspiracy theories in the workplace).  
 If anti-vaccine conspiracy theories have the potential to negatively influence people’s 
intentions to vaccinate, a challenge for scholars is therefore to consider if action needs to be 
taken to challenge them, and if so, what form this action should take.  Existing efforts to 
improve vaccination intentions use expert sources to persuade people toward vaccination 
(Hopfer, 2012) and emphasise that vaccination is normative (Conroy, et al., 2009).  Such 
persuasive methods have met with some success.  The U.S state of Oregon also recently 
passed legislation that requires all parents or guardians who wish to claim an exemption from 
vaccination (that is not based on medical grounds), to receive education about the benefits 
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and risks of vaccination (Public Health Oregon, 2015).  These methods however have not yet 
considered the role of conspiracy theories.  Anti-vaccine conspiracy theories reflect suspicion 
and mistrust of scientific research, and can be used as an avenue to counteract evidence that 
vaccines are effective, safe and necessary (Kata, 2010).  Suspicion and mistrust of vaccines 
may therefore be enhanced by conspiracy theories.  Examining current efforts to improve 
vaccination intentions, whilst also taking into account the potential effects of conspiracy 
theories, is therefore an important challenge for researchers.  
Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) made a number of suggestions to address the potential 
harms of conspiracy theories in general.  One practical suggestion is to issue public anti-
conspiracy arguments about specific conspiracy theories in order to arm people against the 
potential dangers of misinformation.  Specifically, by responding to conspiratorial 
explanations for past events and current controversies, governments and health professionals 
may be able to address potentially harmful effects on people’s attitudes and behaviors.  
However, Sunstein and Vermeule note that conspiracy theories may be extremely resistant to 
correction, and “contrary evidence can usually be shown to be a product of the conspiracy 
itself” (p. 210).  It is therefore doubtful whether simply presenting anti-conspiracy arguments 
would be sufficient to influence conspiracy belief or behavioral intentions.  
Banas and Miller (2013) directly tested this question, examining the effectiveness of 
two types of anti-conspiracy arguments.  They asked participants to watch a 40-minute 
chapter from the 9/11 Truth Movement conspiracy theory film, Loose Change: Final Cut.  
Participants were then exposed to either a factual anti-conspiracy argument (e.g., that the film 
provided no evidence of explosives), or a logic-based anti-conspiracy argument (e.g., that the 
theory lacks parsimony).  A control condition included no anti-conspiracy material.   
Afterwards, participants indicated their belief in the theory that the United States government 
participated in a conspiracy to carry out the 9/11 attacks.  Results demonstrated that both 
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experimental conditions reduced belief in the 9/11 conspiracy theory relative to the control 
message.  However, the fact-based message was more effective than the logic-based 
argument.  The authors note this could be because “applying logic to a problem might be 
more challenging than understanding that the facts being presented are incorrect” (p. 199).  
Whatever exact mechanisms drive the effects, results suggest that fact-based anti-conspiracy 
arguments may be an effective tool to reduce belief in conspiracy theories. 
Jolley and Douglas’s (2014a) research provides further support for this possibility.  
Specifically, exposure to anti-conspiracy arguments reduced belief in conspiracy theories 
relative to a control condition.  However, less encouragingly, results also indicated that 
exposure to anti-conspiracy information did not improve intentions to vaccinate a fictional 
child relative to the control condition.  Whilst it may be straightforward to influence belief in 
conspiracy theories by introducing factual arguments, this may have limited effectiveness on 
making people change their behaviors.  As Jolley and Douglas (2014a) argued, “once the 
very idea of a conspiracy has been mentioned and taken root, even strong [anti-conspiracy] 
arguments may be unable to lead to behavioural action” (p. 8).   
One way to strengthen the persuasiveness of anti-conspiracy arguments may be to 
present them before conspiracy theory material has been presented.  If material presented first 
is relatively controversial, interesting, and familiar to the audience, this tends to produce a 
primacy effect (i.e., the first arguments presented have an advantage; e.g., Furnham, 1986; 
Rosnow, 1966; Rosnow & Robinson, 1967).  If an audience starts with a high level of interest 
that decreases over time, it is more likely that they will be persuaded by arguments presented 
first (Gass & Seiter, 2010).  Conspiracy theories are controversial and interesting by nature.  
They posit novel, often elaborate and unconventional explanations for events.  Presenting 
anti-conspiracy arguments before people are exposed to conspiracy material may therefore 
inoculate them (e.g., McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961; Pfau & van Bockern, 1994) from any 
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potentially harmful consequences by providing a defence against the conspiracy theory.  We 
tested this possibility in the current research.  
 In two studies, participants were given anti-conspiracy arguments concerning 
vaccination either before or after conspiracy arguments, or in the absence of each other.  We 
examined the extent to which anti-conspiracy information improves vaccination intentions 
and the importance of presentation order.  We also examined the potential mediating roles of 
anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and the perception that vaccines are dangerous.  These studies 
present a first attempt to undermine the potentially negative consequences of anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories that have been observed in previous research.  
Study 1 
Participants were asked to read one of five combinations of arguments: (1) conspiracy 
arguments only, (2) anti-conspiracy arguments only, (3) arguments refuting anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories, followed by arguments in favor (anti-conspiracy/conspiracy), (4) 
arguments in favor of conspiracy theories, followed by arguments refuting them 
(conspiracy/anti-conspiracy), or (5) a control condition where participants were presented 
with no information.   Participants were then asked to rate their belief in a series of anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories and the extent to which they perceived vaccines to be dangerous.  
Finally, participants were presented with a scenario depicting a fictitious child.  They were 
asked to imagine that they were faced with the decision to have this child vaccinated against 
a specific (made up) disease (see Jolley & Douglas, 2014a).  They were then given some 
information about the disease and the vaccination and were asked to indicate their intention 
to have the child vaccinated.   
To first demonstrate the potential dangers of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and 
replicate previous research, we predicted that intentions to vaccinate would be reduced when 
people were exposed to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a) (H1).  
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We also examined the mediating factor observed in previous research (the perception that 
vaccines are dangerous) and belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (Jolley & Douglas, 
2014a).  In the current investigation however, we aimed to extend previous research by 
testing a serial mediation model.  We predicted that exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories would increase belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, which may then directly 
lead to a heightened perception that vaccines are dangerous.  In turn, this perception may 
reduce intentions to vaccinate a fictional child (H2).  To test our intervention, we predicted 
that vaccination intentions would improve when anti-conspiracy arguments are presented 
before conspiracy theories (H3).  We further predicted that this effect of the intervention 
would be explained by reduced belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories leading to the belief 
that vaccines are less dangerous, thus improving vaccination intentions (H4).  
Method 
Participants and design 
Two hundred sixty seven participants (97 women and 170 men, Mage = 31.73, SD = 
9.93) were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurkTM).  Participants were residents 
of the U.S.A. and received 75 cents payment.  At the end of the questionnaire, participants 
were asked if they devoted their full attention to the study and if there were any distractions.  
Participants who rated four and above (out of five, with five indicating no attention and many 
distractions) were removed from analyses.  The final sample size was 260 (95 women and 
165 men, Mage = 31.90, SD = 9.96).  There were 55 participants in the conspiracy condition, 
52 in the anti-conspiracy condition, 51 in the conspiracy/anti-conspiracy condition, 50 in the 
anti-conspiracy/conspiracy condition, and 52 in the control condition. One hundred thirty one 
(50.4%) were parents, who had an average of 1.16 (SD = 0.46) children, with the youngest 
being 3.47 (SD = 1.37) years old.  The study was a single-factor between-subjects design 
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(conspiracy vs. anti-conspiracy vs. anti-conspiracy/ conspiracy vs. conspiracy/anti-conspiracy 
vs. control).     
Materials and procedure 
 Participants indicated their informed consent before beginning the questionnaire.  
Next, they were randomly assigned to one of the five experimental conditions. The 
conspiracy and anti-conspiracy articles were identical in all conditions, which were taken 
from previous research (see supplementary materials in Jolley & Douglas 2014a: 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0089177#s5).  Following 
previous research, the term ‘conspiracy theory’ was not mentioned in either of the articles 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  Extracts from the conspiracy and anti-conspiracy articles, 
respectively, are as follows: 
 “…further, there is a significant amount of evidence that vaccines can hurt more 
than they help. For example, by the year 2002, tens of thousands of reactions to 
vaccines, including deaths, were reported…”  
“…further, there is little evidence to suggest that vaccines are harmful.  The side 
effects are minimal and whilst millions of people have been immunised over the years, 
less than .005% have ever had an adverse reaction to a vaccine...” 
We used the manipulation check measure from previous research (that asks participants to 
indicate their anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a) as a potential 
mediator variable. There were eleven statements (e.g., “Misrepresentation of the efficacy of 
vaccines is motivated by profit”, 1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; α = .79). 
Participants then indicated the extent to which they felt that vaccines were dangerous 
(Betsch & Sachse, 2013; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a).  There were eight statements (e.g., 
“Vaccines lead to allergies”, 1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; α = .94).  Participants 
were then asked to imagine a scenario in which they were the parent of an infant (Sophie, 
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aged 8 months; Betsch & Sachse, 2013; Betsch, Renkewitz, & Haase, 2013; Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014a).  They were informed that their doctor had provided them with information 
regarding the (fictitious) disease dysomeria, which may lead to serious consequences with 
symptoms such as fever and vomiting.  After reading the scenario, participants indicated their 
intention to have the fictional child vaccinated (“If you had the opportunity to vaccinate your 
child (Sophie, aged 8 months) against dysomeria next week, what would you decide; 1 = 
definitely not vaccinate, 7 =definitely vaccinate).  At the end of the study, participants were 
debriefed and informed that the information presented in the article was fictional.  They were 
also pointed towards websites containing factual information about vaccines, vaccine efficacy 
and vaccine safety before being thanked and paid for their participation. 
Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  No results were affected by the 
participants’ parental status, nor their age or gender.  These factors are not reported further.  
Consequences of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
Anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and vaccination intentions.  To test H1, 
differences in vaccination intentions between the conspiracy, anti-conspiracy and control 
conditions were examined.  There was a significant difference in vaccination intentions 
across conditions, F(4, 255) =  5.00, p = .001, η2 = .07.  Intentions were significantly lower in 
the conspiracy condition than the anti-conspiracy condition (p < .001) and the control 
condition (p < .001).  Intentions were no different between the anti-conspiracy condition and 
control (p = .718).  This replicates previous research (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a).    
Belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and perceived dangers of vaccines.  To 
test H2, separate ANOVAs were first conducted between conspiracy, anti-conspiracy and 
control conditions as the independent variable, and mean scores on the two potential 
mediators (belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and perceived vaccine dangers) as 
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dependent variables.  There was a significant difference in belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories between conditions, F(4, 255) = 9.46, p < .001, η2= .13.  Conspiracy belief was 
significantly higher in the conspiracy condition than the anti-conspiracy condition (p < .001) 
and the control condition (p = .001).  Moreover, conspiracy belief was significantly lower in 
the anti-conspiracy than the control condition (p = .017).  There was also a significant 
difference in belief in perceived dangers of vaccines between conditions, F(4, 255) = 8.32, p 
< .001, η2= .12.  Participants in the conspiracy condition perceived vaccines to be more 
dangerous than those in the anti-conspiracy condition (p < .001) and the control (p = .001).  
The perception that vaccines are dangerous was also lower in the anti-conspiracy than the 
control condition (p = .031).  Findings therefore replicate Jolley and Douglas (2014a).   
Testing serial mediation. Building on Jolley and Douglas (2014a), each candidate 
mediator was examined in a test of serial mediation to explain the effect of the conspiracy 
condition on vaccination intentions (H2).  This was carried out using Hayes’ (2013) 
bootstrapping method for indirect effects, using PROCESS, Model 6 including two serial 
mediators with 5,000 bootstrapped resamples and a 95% confidence interval.  This method 
allows us to test the ‘direct effect’ of conspiracy arguments on vaccination intentions, 
alongside the ‘indirect effect’ encompassing the effect of conspiracy arguments on 
vaccination intentions when each of the two mediators increase.  This method also allows the 
‘indirect effect’ of several mediators to be tested, specifically the effect of the conspiracy 
argument changing one mediator, which then directly leads to a change in the next.   
The pro-conspiracy condition was coded as the representative condition and was 
compared to the anti-conspiracy condition (D1) and control (D2) separately.  Results (see 
Figure 1) demonstrated that both mediation models were significant.  Conspiracy arguments 
increased belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, which directly increased belief in the 
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perceived dangers of vaccines, and subsequently reduced intentions to vaccinate a fictional 
child.  This replicates and extends previous research (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a). 
Addressing anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
Anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and vaccination intentions.  We next examined 
the success of altering the order of the conspiracy and anti-conspiracy arguments as an 
avenue to improve vaccine uptake after being exposed to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
(H3). Vaccination intentions were improved when participants were presented with anti-
conspiracy arguments prior to exposure to conspiracy theories (p = .047), but not when 
presented with anti-conspiracy arguments after exposure to conspiracy theories (p = .263), 
compared to conspiracy arguments.  As predicted therefore, anti-conspiracy arguments 
presented prior to exposure to conspiracy theories improved vaccination intentions.  
However, conspiracy theories appear difficult to correct once established.   
Belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and perceived dangers of vaccines.  
Next, the two mediators were examined in order to test effectiveness of the order of 
arguments in reducing these mediating factors.  Belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
was lower when participants were presented with anti-conspiracy arguments prior to 
conspiracy arguments (p = .006), but not when presented with anti-conspiracy arguments 
after conspiracy arguments (p = .211), compared to conspiracy arguments.  The perception 
that vaccines are dangerous was also lower when participants were presented with anti-
conspiracy arguments prior to conspiracy arguments (p = .003), but not when presented with 
anti-conspiracy arguments after conspiracy arguments (p = .171), compared to conspiracy 
information only.  Therefore, presenting anti-conspiracy arguments prior to conspiracy 
theories reduced belief in the conspiracy account and the perception that vaccines are 
dangerous.  Once the conspiracy theory was established however, anti-conspiracy arguments 
did not successfully attenuate these beliefs and perceptions.    
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Testing serial mediation. We next tested whether the mediating factors explain the 
improvement in vaccination intentions when anti-conspiracy arguments were presented first 
(H4).  The conspiracy condition was coded as the representative group and compared to 
conspiracy/anti-conspiracy and anti-conspiracy/conspiracy conditions.  Results (see Figure 2) 
demonstrated that the mediation model between conspiracy and anti-conspiracy/conspiracy 
was significant (D1).  In this case, exposure to anti-conspiracy arguments, then conspiracy 
arguments (in comparison to conspiracy arguments alone) reduced belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories, which then reduced perceptions that vaccines are dangerous, 
subsequently improving behavioral intentions.  There was no significant mediation between 
conspiracy and pro-conspiracy/anti-conspiracy conditions (D2). 
In summary, exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories reduced vaccination 
intentions, an effect mediated by anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and perceptions that 
vaccines are dangerous.  When anti-conspiracy arguments were presented before conspiracy 
theories, vaccination intentions improved relative to the conspiracy condition, and this effect 
was mediated by anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and the perception that vaccines are 
dangerous.  However, when anti-conspiracy arguments were presented after conspiracy 
arguments, the intervention was less effective.  This last finding supports Lewandowsky, 
Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, and Cook’s (2012) observation that misinformation may be “sticky” 
(p. 107).  In particular, when people do not have the opportunity to prepare a defense to 
misinformation, the misinformation can be more persuasive.  Our findings suggest, therefore, 
that prior exposure to correct information (i.e., ‘inoculation’) may be a successful way to 
address the effects of conspiracy theories in the controversial case of anti-vaccination.   
Study 2 
In Study 2, we aimed to replicate these findings, focusing solely on the inoculation 
effect observed in support of H3 and H4.  In recent years, the importance of replication has 
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been underscored (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Reis & Lee, in press) and in the process of 
developing an intervention to address a significant social issue, replication is arguably at its 
most important.  We therefore aimed to provide further evidence that inoculation may be a 
valuable tool to improve vaccination intentions.  Participants were presented with anti-
conspiracy information either before, or after information supporting anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories.  We predicted that anti-conspiracy information presented prior to conspiracy 
theories would improve vaccination intentions (H3) and that this effect would be mediated by 
anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and perceptions concerning vaccine dangers (H4).  
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred eighty participants (94 women, 84 men, 1 Transgendered/Other, Mage = 
33.76, SD = 11.76) were recruited via Prolific Academic. Participants were residents of the 
U.S.A. and received one dollar as payment.  At the end of the questionnaire, participants 
were asked the same attention check questions as in Study 1.  Five participants failed and the 
final sample size was 175 (95 women, 79 men, 1 transgender/other, Mage = 34.02, SD = 
11.10).  There were 58 participants in the conspiracy condition, 64 in the anti-
conspiracy/conspiracy condition, and 53 in the conspiracy/anti-conspiracy condition.  Sixty 
four (36.6%) were parents, who had an average of 2.22 (SD = 1.55) children, with the 
youngest being 13.63 (SD = 9.12) years old.  The study was a single-factor independent 
variable between-subjects design (conspiracy vs. anti-conspiracy/ conspiracy vs. 
conspiracy/anti-conspiracy).   
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were identical to Study 1 except for the removal of the 
anti-conspiracy and control conditions.  Scales of belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (α 
= .92) and the perception that vaccines are dangerous (α = .94) were reliable.  
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Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.  No results were affected by the 
participants’ parental status, nor their age or gender.  These factors are not reported further.  
Anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and vaccination intentions.  To again test H3, 
differences in vaccination intentions between the conspiracy and the two intervention 
conditions were examined.  There was a significant difference in vaccination intentions 
across conditions, F(2, 172) =  4.64, p = .011, η2 = .05.  Vaccination intentions were 
improved when participants were presented with anti-conspiracy arguments prior to 
conspiracy theories (p = .003), but not when presented with anti-conspiracy arguments after 
conspiracy theories (p = .164), compared to the conspiracy condition.  This replicates the 
results in Study 1 and provides further support for H3. 
Belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and perceived dangers of vaccines.  To 
test potential mediators in support of H4, separate ANOVAs were first conducted between 
the conspiracy and two intervention conditions, and the mean scores on the two potential 
mediators (belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and perceived vaccine dangers) were the 
dependent variables.  Results revealed a significant difference in belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories between conditions, F(2, 172) = 6.29, p = .002, η2 = .07.  Belief was 
lower when participants were presented with anti-conspiracy arguments prior to conspiracy 
arguments (p = .001), but not when presented with anti-conspiracy arguments after 
conspiracy arguments (p = .100), compared to the conspiracy condition.  There was also a 
significant difference in belief in perceived dangers of vaccines between conditions, F(2, 
172) = 4.64, p = .011, η2= .05.  Perceptions were lower when participants were presented 
with anti-conspiracy arguments prior to conspiracy arguments (p = .008), but not when 
presented with anti-conspiracy arguments after conspiracy arguments (p = .460), compared to 
the conspiracy condition.    
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Testing serial mediation. The same mediation procedure was followed as in Study 1, 
in order to provide further support for H4.  Similarly therefore, the conspiracy condition was 
coded as the representative group and compared to anti-conspiracy/conspiracy (D1) and 
conspiracy/anti-conspiracy conditions (D2).  The mediation model between conspiracy and 
anti-conspiracy/conspiracy (D1) was significant (see Figure 3).  Exposure to anti-conspiracy 
arguments, then conspiracy arguments (in comparison to conspiracy arguments alone) 
reduced belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, which then reduced perceptions that 
vaccines are dangerous, subsequently improving behavioral intentions.  There was no 
significant mediation between conspiracy and conspiracy/anti-conspiracy conditions (D2). 
In summary, as in Study 1, exposure to anti-conspiracy arguments before conspiracy 
theories reduced conspiracy belief, leading to a reduction in the belief that vaccines are 
dangerous, and improving vaccination intentions (H3 and H4).  Vaccination intentions were 
not improved when anti-conspiracy arguments were presented after conspiracy theories.   
General discussion 
The current research suggests that anti-vaccine conspiracy theories negatively 
influence vaccination intentions, but that these effects may be intervened upon with anti-
conspiracy information presented before the conspiracy theories have been established.  Once 
the conspiracy theories have been established however, anti-conspiracy information appears 
to be less effective. These results therefore suggest that combating the potentially negative 
consequences of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories may be achieved if people are exposed to 
accurate scientific information before the conspiracy theories. 
Our work has replicated and extended previous research examining the role of anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories on behavioral intention outcomes (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a).  
First, we have shown that exposure to pro-conspiracy information reduces peoples’ intentions 
to vaccinate a fictional child, relative to an anti-conspiracy condition, or a control.  We 
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extended this finding by testing a serial mediation model, and found that exposure to 
conspiracy theories increased belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories leading to an increase 
in the perception that vaccines are dangerous, which consequently reduced participants’ 
intentions to vaccinate a fictional child.   
Next, we systemically tested a technique to address conspiracy theories.  Anti-
conspiracy arguments were shown to improve vaccination intentions (when compared to the 
conspiracy only condition) if presented prior to conspiracy theories.  This provides empirical 
evidence of the success of a technique to address conspiracy theories.  We suggest that by 
presenting anti-conspiracy information first, this may in some way inoculate people from the 
potential harm of conspiracy theories.  Previous research by McGuire and Papageorgis (1961) 
has demonstrated, for example, that providing people with a defense (i.e., refuting arguments) 
before hearing an attacking message provides a better defense than not being provided with 
any information at all.  These refuting arguments presented in advance made people more 
resistant to persuasion.  In our current investigation, we argue that providing anti-conspiracy 
arguments before conspiracy arguments offers people some kind of means of defense, 
making them more resistant to persuasion by conspiracy theories.  We also found however, 
that anti-conspiracy information presented after conspiracy theories did not improve 
vaccination intentions.  Lewandowsky, et al. (2012) refer to misinformation as being “sticky” 
and often resistant to correction (p. 107).  Without being given the time to prepare a defense 
beforehand, the misinformation is potentially more persuasive than correct arguments.  The 
current findings suggest similarly that once a conspiracy theory has become established, it 
may indeed ‘stick’ and become resistant to attempts at correction by accurate scientific 
information about vaccines.  
Conspiracy theories are extremely easy to access through friends, acquaintances, and 
on the Internet (e.g., Coady, 2006).  Also, conspiracy theories tend to surface very quickly 
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after an event has happened (e.g., Leman, 2007).  For other types of conspiracy theories (e.g., 
when a celebrity dies or there is a major world disaster), it may therefore not be possible to 
present anti-conspiracy arguments prior to conspiracy theories.  However, this intervention is 
more practical in the case of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories.  For example, people may not 
come across anti-vaccine conspiracy theories very much until they have children.  They may 
therefore be reasonably unaware of conspiracy theories that may influence their judgment 
until the judgment becomes immanent for them.  However, we must also note that in the 
current research parental status did not appear to influence the results.  It seems that once a 
person (parent or non-parent) is exposed to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, counter-
arguments alone are less effective in improving vaccination intentions.   
Interventions therefore that focus on educating people before conspiracy theories have 
taken root may be effective in improving vaccination intentions.  For others who have already 
taken on board anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, stronger interventions will likely be required 
to refute them.  As mentioned earlier, the U.S. state of Oregon has recently passed legislation 
that requires parents or guardians to watch an education video before they are allowed a 
vaccination exemption.  Such a technique may indeed improve vaccine uptake and time will 
tell if this is the case.  However, our findings suggest that the success of such an intervention 
may depend on a person’s prior exposure to conspiracy theories.  If a person has not been 
exposed very much to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, their vaccination intentions could be 
improved by such a technique.  For those who have already taken on board the conspiracy 
theories however, merely providing factual information on vaccines may be less effective and 
stronger interventions may be required.   
Previous research has shown for example that in some cases counter-arguments not 
only need to provide original opposing arguments, but also need to explicitly argue against 
each of the points included in the misinformation (Gass & Seiter, 2010).  Researchers have 
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found that non-refutation counter-arguments (i.e., opposing arguments mentioned, but not 
arguing against the initial argument presented) are less effective than refutation counter-
arguments (Allen, 1993, 1998; Allen, et al., 1990; O’Keefe, 1999).  It is therefore reasonable 
to suggest that an anti-conspiracy argument that clearly argues against the conspiracy theory 
(as opposed to just presenting the anti-conspiracy information) may be more successful in 
attenuating the influence of conspiracy theories.  An anti-conspiracy argument that directly 
refutes conspiracy theories could therefore be tested in future research as a means to combat 
the impact of conspiracy theories. 
In a similar vein, another method may be to make the anti-conspiracy argument 
equally as interesting and controversial as the conspiracy theory account, alongside arguing 
against the conspiracy theory.  For example, in the context of vaccines, more background 
could be provided surrounding Andrew Wakefield’s 1998 article in The Lancet, how the 
research was discredited, and that the author is no longer permitted to practice medicine.  For 
example, this may involve a discussion on Wakefield’s undisclosed financial conflicts of 
interest, failed replications of Wakefield’s findings, and his work ultimately being identified 
as an elaborate fraud.  Providing more contextual details may make the anti-conspiracy 
arguments more interesting than just supplying the facts that refute the conspiracy argument.   
In addition to making anti-conspiracy arguments more interesting, interventions may 
also use the technique of forewarning.  Previous research has shown that combining refuting 
information with a warning about misinformation (i.e., that people tend to rely on 
misinformation even when it has been shown to be unreliable), enables participants to better 
resist misinformation than when refuting information is presented alone (Eakin, Schreiber & 
Sergent-Marshall, 2003).  It is argued that this technique is successful because a forewarning 
enables recipients to more closely monitor incoming messages (Lewandowsky, Ecker, 
Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012).  In other words, being given a forewarning may induce a 
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temporary state of skepticism and prompt the recipient to become more vigilant, and they 
may therefore be more likely to suppress misinformation (Eakin et al., 2003; Lewandowsky 
et al., 2012).  A similar warning approach may work to lessen the negative effects of 
conspiracy theories once they have been established.   
Finally, as we mentioned in the introduction, interventions already exist that target 
anti-vaccine attitudes and behavior.  For instance, interventions include using expert sources 
to make information appear more credible (Hopfer, 2012) or emphasising that vaccination is 
normative behavior (Conroy et al., 2009).  These interventions, although not directly targeted 
at conspiracy belief, may nevertheless contain strategies or techniques that reduce conspiracy 
belief.  Future research could therefore address how current interventions may influence 
conspiracy belief as a route to attitude and behavior change.  A further challenge for future 
research may also be to address how interventions that target conspiracy belief may be used 
in conjunction with existing interventions.  
Some limitations of the current research should also be considered in future 
investigations.  For example, the intervention tested in the current research was based on anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories only and it is therefore not possible to conclude that all 
conspiracy theories may be resistant to correction.  As mentioned previously, many 
conspiracy theories may emerge too quickly after an event to prevent pre-exposure to them, 
making inoculation almost impossible.  It is also reasonable to propose that anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories may be more persuasive than other types of conspiracy theories.  Indeed, 
the conspiracy theory statements used in the present study discussed childhood vaccinations, 
which could be more emotionally laden than other conspiracy theories.  Nonetheless, future 
research could examine the success of techniques for intervening upon other types of 
conspiracy theories, and especially perhaps climate change conspiracy theories for which 
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there is ample scientific evidence to draw upon (Douglas & Sutton, 2015; Lewandowsky et 
al., 2013).  
Further, the mediators in the current investigation were not manipulated, and therefore 
we cannot rule out the possibility that a third variable may have affected both the mediators 
and the outcome.  Future research could examine whether this makes a difference to the 
effectiveness of the intervention.  Another factor to note is that the outcome measure used in 
the current investigation were based on intentions to vaccinate a fictional child.  It is widely 
known however that intentions do not always lead to real behaviors (e.g., LaPiere, 1934; 
Sheeran, 2002).  Although a challenging research endeavour, future research could therefore 
attempt to examine whether explicit anti-conspiracy arguments presented prior to conspiracy 
theories can improve actual vaccination behavior.  Moreover, in the current investigation 
arguments were presented one after the other which is not necessarily reflective of how 
people receive information in everyday life.  Future research could therefore examine the 
effectiveness of the current intervention with different time gaps between exposure to 
conspiracy and non-conspiracy information.  This would also address any potential fatigue 
effects due to participants reading the information pages one after the other.  Moreover, 
participants’ prior knowledge concerning vaccination, and belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories, were not assessed in either of the current studies (with perhaps the exception of the 
control group in Study 1 to some degree).  Future research could therefore examine whether 
existing knowledge about vaccination, and/or strength of prior belief in conspiracy theories 
influences the effectiveness of the intervention.   
Future research could also attempt to enhance anti-conspiracy arguments by 
manipulating how they are presented to the reader.  We know that certain sources are trusted 
more than others as a means to acquire information on a variety of topics.  For example, 
people are more likely to seek information about vaccines via the Internet than through their 
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doctor (Downs, Bruine de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2008).  Varying the source of the counter-
material could highlight which sources are therefore most trustworthy, and thus which are 
likely to have the most weight in making counter-arguments credible to the reader.  Future 
research could also look into presenting anti-conspiracy material on other media platforms 
and measuring how the source of information may influence the impact of conspiracy 
theories on behavioral intentions.  For example, anti-conspiracy text could be accompanied 
by images, or presented in a video or podcast format.  Previous research has shown that anti-
conspiracy arguments concerning the NASA moon landing accompanied by photographs 
reduced conspiracy beliefs below baseline (Swami, et al., 2012).  Techniques such as this 
may be particularly applicable in developing education videos that aim to increase vaccine 
uptake. 
Conclusion 
Emerging research highlights the potential dangers of conspiracy theories.  
Conspiracy theories may not only stop people from engaging with important aspects of 
society, such as voting, engaging with their work, and vaccinating their children (Douglas & 
Leite, in press; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b), but their effects may be difficult to 
alleviate.  We found that whilst vaccination intentions could be improved when anti-
conspiracy arguments were present prior to conspiracy theories, if they came afterwards, the 
intervention was unsuccessful.  Once a conspiracy account has become established, it may be 
resistant to correction.  Ongoing investigations are therefore needed to develop interventions 
designed for this type of persuasive communication. 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations across Conditions for Conspiracy Belief, Perceptions that 
Vaccines are Dangerous, and Intentions to Vaccinate in Study 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     Means (SD) 
Condition Anti-vaccine 
conspiracy belief 
Perceived dangers 
of vaccines 
Intention to 
vaccinate 
Conspiracy 4.47 (0.81) 4.50 (1.26) 4.42 (1.76) 
Anti-conspiracy 3.38 (1.02) 2.92 (1.57) 5.60 (1.49) 
Control 3.83 (1.12) 3.55 (1.62) 5.50 (1.21) 
Anti-conspiracy/Conspiracy 3.94 (1.00) 3.63 (1.56) 5.04 (1.69) 
Conspiracy/Anti-conspiracy 4.23 (0.91) 4.04 (1.45) 4.80 (1.77) 
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Point Estimate: 0.45 (SE: .16); Monte Carlo CI (95%): 0.1692 / 0.8031 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Point Estimate: 0.20 (SE: .11); Monte Carlo CI (95%): 0.0220 / 0.4521 
 
Figure 1. A serial mediation test of conspiracy condition (D1, conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy, 
versus D2, conspiracy versus control) on vaccination intentions (DV) through belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories and the perception that vaccines are dangerous in Study 1 (MVs) (N = 260; 
5000 bootstrap samples) 
Note. First number represents b statistic and the second is the S.E.  **p<.05, ***p<.001.   
Perceived 
dangers 
Anti-vaccine 
conspiracy belief 
Vaccination 
intention 
 
D1 
 
-0.85 (.16)*** 
1.29 (.05)*** 
-0.41 (.11)*** 
-0.05 (.17) -0.06 (.13) 
(0.82 [.26]**) 
0.31 (.25) 
Perceived 
dangers 
Anti-vaccine 
conspiracy belief 
Vaccination 
intention 
 
D2 
-0.39 (.16)** -0.41 (.11)*** -0.05 (.17) 
-0.03 (.10) 
(0.73 [.27]**) 
0.49 (.24) 
1.29 (.05)*** 
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Point Estimate: -0.24 (SE: .12); Monte Carlo CI (95%): -0.5175 / -0.0507 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Point Estimate: -0.12 (SE: 09); Monte Carlo CI (95%): -0.3496 / 0.0421 
 
Figure 2. A serial mediation test of conspiracy condition (D1, conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy / 
conspiracy, versus D2, conspiracy versus conspiracy / anti-conspiracy) on vaccination intentions 
(DV) through belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and perception that vaccines are dangerous 
in Study 1 (MVs) (N = 260; 5000 bootstrap samples) 
Note. First number represents b statistic and the second is the S.E.  **p<.05, ***p<.001.   
Perceived 
dangers 
Anti-vaccine 
conspiracy belief 
Vaccination 
intention 
 
D1 
 
-0.47 (.18)** 
1.28 (.05)*** 
-0.40 (.11)*** 
-0.05 (.17) 0.18 (.15) 
(-0.39 [.30]**) 
-0.34 (.28) 
Perceived 
dangers 
Anti-vaccine 
conspiracy belief 
Vaccination 
intention 
 
D2 
-0.24 (.19) 
1.29 (.05)*** 
-0.41 (.11)*** 
-0.05 (.17) -0.16 (.16) 
(-0.39 [.31]) 
-0.18 (.29) 
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Table 2  
Means and Standard Deviations across Conditions for Conspiracy Belief, Perceptions that 
Vaccines are Dangerous, and Intentions to Vaccinate in Study 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                     Means (SD) 
Condition Anti-vaccine 
conspiracy belief 
Perceived dangers 
of vaccines 
Intention to 
vaccinate 
Conspiracy 3.61 (1.50) 3.28 (1.66) 5.16 (1.97) 
Anti-conspiracy/Conspiracy 2.76 (1.23) 2.56 (1.48) 6.05 (1.20) 
Conspiracy/Anti-conspiracy 3.19 (1.20) 3.08 (1.29) 5.58 (1.63) 
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Point Estimate: 0.38 (SE: .17); Monte Carlo CI (95%): 0.0932 / 0.7704 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Point Estimate: 0.19 (SE: .14); Monte Carlo CI (95%): -0.0333 / 0.4963 
 
Figure 3. A serial mediation test of conspiracy condition (D1, conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy / 
conspiracy, versus D2, conspiracy versus conspiracy / anti-conspiracy) on vaccination intentions 
(DV) through belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and perception that vaccines are dangerous 
in Study 2 (MVs) (N = 175; 5000 bootstrap samples) 
Note. First number represents b statistic and the second is the S.E.  **p<.05, ***p<.001.   
Perceived 
dangers 
Anti-vaccine 
conspiracy belief 
Vaccination 
intention 
 
D1 
 
-0.85 (.24)** 
0.98 (.04)*** 
-0.46 (.13)*** 
-0.27 (.17) 0.10 (.14) 
(0.89 [.30]**) 
0.33 (.24) 
Perceived 
dangers 
Anti-vaccine 
conspiracy belief 
Vaccination 
intention 
 
D2 
-0.42 (.25) 
0.98 (.04)*** 
-0.46 (.13)*** 
-0.27 (.17) 0.20 (.10) 
(0.43[.30]) 
0.22 (.25) 
